Abstract. Imperfect recall games represent dynamic interactions where players forget previously known information, such as history of played actions. The importance of imperfect recall games stems from allowing a concise representation of strategies compared to perfect recall games where players remember all information. However, most of the algorithmic results are negative for imperfect recall games -a Nash equilibrium (NE) does not have to exist and computing a best response or a maxmin strategy is NP-hard. We focus on a subclass of imperfect recall games, called A-loss recall games, where a best response can be found in polynomial time. We derive novel properties of A-loss recall games, including (1) a sufficient and necessary condition for the existence of NE in A-loss recall games, (2) example where both NE and maxmin require irrational numbers for rational input, and (3) NP-hardness of problems related to finding maxmin strategies and existence of a NE strategy.
Introduction
Dynamic games with finite number of moves are modeled as extensive-form games (EFGs). These games are visualized as game trees where nodes correspond to states of the game and edges to actions executed by players. This representation is general enough to model stochastic events and imperfect information when players are unable to distinguish among several states. If we assume that all players perfectly remember history and all information gained during the course of the game, we say that the game has perfect recall. If this assumption does not hold 1 , we talk about EFGs with imperfect recall, or imperfect recall games.
There are several strategy representations that can be used in EFGs. A pure strategy assigns one action to every decision point of the game, a mixed strategy is a probability distribution over the set of pure strategies. A behavioral strategy, on the other hand, uses a probability distribution over actions in every decision point. In perfect recall games, there is an equivalence between mixed and behavioral strategies [11] . However, this equivalence no longer holds in imperfect recall games. An EFG with imperfect recall, circle nodes represent the states of the game, numbers in the circles shows which player acts in that node (player 1 or 2), dashed lines represent indistinguishable states, and box nodes are the terminal states with utility values (player 1 maximizes the utility, player 2 minimizes). This game has A-loss recall, but a NE in behavioral strategies does not exist (from [16] ).
Example (known): Consider the game depicted in Figure 1 . This game has 4 pure strategies for player 1 S = {(a, c), (a, d), (b, c), (b, d)}. A mixed strategy can condition the actions of players on information that the players should forget. For example, a mixed strategy where (a, c) and (b, d) are played with uniform probability 0.5 allows player 1 to condition playing c and d on the outcome of the non-deterministic choice in the root of the game, and thus randomize between the leftmost and the rightmost state in information set of player 2. Note that one cannot model the same behavior using a behavioral strategy that assigns for every decision point a probability distribution over the actions available, and therefore no additional information can be disclosed to the player. To exploit the concise strategy representation allowed in imperfect recall games, however, one must seek optimal behavioral strategies.
Finding optimal behavioral strategies in imperfect recall games is a difficult problem. First of all, main game-theoretic solution concept, Nash equilibrium (NE), does not have to exist in behavioral strategies even in zero-sum games ( Figure 1 provides an example from [16] of such a game) and checking whether an imperfect recall game has a NE in behavioral strategies was shown to be an NP-hard problem [3] 2 . Secondly, many related problems are NP-hard in imperfect recall games including computing a best response, or computing mixed maxmin strategies [7, 3] , or Σ p 2 -complete when computing pure maxmin strategies [7] . Finally, a maxmin strategy may require to use irrational numbers even in games with rational payoffs [7] .
The existing negative results rise a natural question about the existence and computation of NE in behavioral strategies in imperfect recall games: Is there a subclass of imperfect recall games where the existence of NE can be exactly characterized and optimal strategies computed? Answering this question can help in finding a concise representation of dynamic games that does not require the perfect memory and thus allowing solving large dynamic games. Previous works answer this question only in part -specifically, by defining the (skewed) wellformed games as a subset of imperfect recall games. In (skewed) well-formed games, players are only allowed to forget information that leads to joining two decision points that have similar histories and there exists a mapping between terminal states reachable from these decision points such that the difference of payoffs between the mapped leafs is bounded. With this assumption, standard perfect-recall algorithms (namely Counterfactual Regret Minimization; CFR) are still guaranteed to find an approximate NE (no-regret) behavioral strategy [12, 10] . However, the restrictions defined by (skewed) well-formed games are rather strict and they give only a sufficient condition for the existence of a NE and for the convergence of CFR.
We focus on the subclass of A-loss recall games [4, 5] that form a significantly less restrictive subset of imperfect recall games compared to (skewed) well-formed games. In A-loss recall games, every loss of information of a player can be tracked to forgetting her own action. A positive effect of this assumption is that computing a best response is in P (recall that the problem is NP-hard in general imperfect recall games). Our results show that the assumption for A-loss recall games allows us to characterize the existence of a NE in behavioral strategies. However, the hardness of computation of both maxmin and NE along with issues with representing exact stable strategies remain. Specifically we show: -sufficient and necessary conditions for any two-player A-loss recall game to have a NE in behavioral strategies (Theorem 1), -a maxmin strategy may need irrational numbers in A-loss recall games with rational payoffs (Theorem 2), -computing maxmin behavioral strategy for a player is NP-hard 3 (Theorem 4), -NE strategies may need irrational numbers in A-loss recall games with rational payoffs, if they exist 4 (Theorem 3), -it is NP-hard to check whether there exists a Nash equilibrium in a two-player zero-sum A-loss recall game 3 (Theorem 5).
Extensive-Form Games
We give necessary technical introduction to extensive-form games (EFGs) and define different types of recall in EFGs. A two player EFG G is a tuple {P, H, Z, P, u, I, A}. P = {1, 2} denotes the set of players. We use i to refer to a player and −i to refer to the opponent of i. Set H contains all the states of the game. P : H → P ∪{c} is the function associating a player from P or the nature c with every h ∈ H. The nature c represents the stochastic environment of the game. Z ⊆ H is a set of terminal states.
is a utility function assigning to each leaf the value of preference for player i; u i : Z → R. For zero-sum games it holds that u i (z) = −u −i (z), ∀z ∈ Z. The imperfect information is defined using the information sets. I i is a partitioning of all {h ∈ H : P (h) = i} into these information sets. All states h contained in one information set I i ∈ I i are indistinguishable to player i. The set of available actions A(h) is the same ∀h ∈ I i . We overload the notation and use A(I i ) as actions available in I i .
A pure strategy s i for player i is a mapping assigning ∀I i ∈ I i a member of A(I i ). S i is a set of all pure strategies for player i. A mixed strategy m i is a probability distribution over S i , set of all mixed strategies of i is denoted as M i . Behavioral strategy b i assigns a probability distribution over A(I i ) for each I i . B i is a set of all behavioral strategies for i, B p i ⊆ B i denotes the set of deterministic behavioral strategies for i. A sequence σ i is a list of actions of player i ordered by their occurrence on the path from the root of the game tree to some node. By seq i (h) we denote the sequence of player i leading to the state h. A strategy profile is a set of strategies, one strategy for each player.
A mixed strategy can be formulated as a realization plan r i that for a sequence σ i represents the probability of playing actions in σ i assuming the other players play such that the actions of σ i can be executed. Realization plan r i has to satisfy network flow property; i.e., r i (σ i ) = a∈A(Ii) r i (σ i · a), where I i is an information set reached by sequence σ i and σ i ·a stands for σ i extended by action a. We say that σ ′ i is a continuation of σ i if σ i forms a prefix of σ ′ i . R i is a set of realization plans for i, R p i ⊆ R i denotes the set of pure realization plans for i. We say that a pair of strategies with arbitrary representation is behaviorally equivalent if they generate the same probability distribution over all z ∈ Z. We overload the notation and use u i as the expected utility of player i when the players play according to pure (mixed, behavioral) strategies or realization plans.
Perfect, Imperfect, and A-loss Recall
A game has perfect recall iff ∀i ∈ P ∀I i ∈ I i all the states in I i share the same history for i. If there exists at least one information set where this does not hold, the game has imperfect recall.
Interestingly, many properties that hold for perfect recall games do not hold for imperfect recall games. Consider, for example, a computation of a best response for a player. In so called absent minded games, where there exists a path from the root of the game tree to some leaf such that an information set I i ∈ I i is visited more than once, the best response may need randomization (e.g., in the game with absentminded driver [14] ). Even in imperfect recall games without absent-mindedness, playing a best action in each information set (called a time consistent strategy [5] ) need not result in an ex ante best response.
Consider example game in Figure 2 between player 1 and chance. The ex ante best response of player 1 in this game is to play B,D,F getting the utility of 5−ε 2 . Note, however, that when player 1 chooses the best action to play in each information set I separately given possible beliefs over states in I, a strategy B,C,E with the expected utility of 2 satisfies this condition.
The equivalence between time consistent strategies and ex ante best responses is shown to hold in a subset of imperfect recall games called A-loss recall games. Additionally, the computation of the best response is in P in Aloss recall games [4, 5] . This motivates our focus on A-loss recall games in this paper.
Definition 1. Player i has A-loss recall if and only if for every I ∈ I i and nodes
Condition (1) in the definition says that if player i has perfect recall then she also has A-loss recall. Condition (2) says that if there exists an information set of player i where two distinct actions a, a ′ have been taken to reach two different nodes in an information set I then player i has A-loss recall. Note that player 1 does not have A-loss recall in the example game since parents of the nodes in information set I 3 are in two distinct information sets I 1 , I 2 and their common predecessor is a chance node. On the other hand, the example game from Figure 1 has A-loss recall.
Existence of Nash Equilibria in A-loss Recall Games
In this section we provide both sufficient and necessary conditions for the existence of Nash equilibrium in behavioral strategies in two-player A-loss recall games without absent mindedness.
Let us first define a Nash equilibrium in behavioral strategies.
Definition 2. We say that strategy profile b = {b i , b −i } is a Nash equilibrium in behavioral strategies iff ∀i ∈ P ∀b
we define a partition H(I i ) of states in every information set I i of some imperfect recall game G to the largest possible subsets, not causing imperfect recall. More formally, let H(I i ) = {H 1 , ..., H n } be a disjoint partition of all h ∈ I i , where
Definition 3. The coarsest perfect recall refinement G ′ of the imperfect recall game G = {P, H, Z, P, u, I, A} is a tuple {P, H, Z, P, u, I
′ , A ′ }, where ∀i ∈ P ∀I i ∈ I i H(I i ) defines the information set partition I ′ . A ′ is a modification of A, which guarantees that
In the Definition 3 we change the labelling of actions described by A to A ′ , since we modify the structure of the imperfect information I to I ′ . We denote by Φ : E → A ′ a function which for an edge e ∈ E, where E is the set of all edges of the game tree of G (and therefore of G ′ ), returns its action label in G ′ , similarly we define Ψ : E → A. In the rest of this section, when we talk about the equivalence of arbitrary strategy representation or sequences in G and G ′ , we talk about the equivalence with respect to Φ and Ψ . Same goes for applying the strategy from G to G ′ and vice versa. Proof. This holds since G is created from G ′ by merging information sets and therefore invalidating the mutually exclusive pure realization plans.
⊓ ⊔ Lemma 3. The set of pure realization plans R pG of an A-loss recall game G is equal to R pG ′ of its coarsest perfect recall refinement.
Proof. First, we prove that ∀i ∈ P ∀r
forms a pure realization plan of G. This follows from Lemma 1, as each H k coincides with an information set in G ′ and i can choose actions independently in every H k when following pure realization plan in G. r ′ i must therefore be a valid pure realization plan of G. Next, we show that ∀i ∈ P ∀r i ∈ R pG it holds that r i forms a pure realization plan of G ′ . This directly follows from Lemma 2. ⊓ ⊔ Lemma 4. Every pure realization plan of an arbitrary imperfect recall game G can be represented as a deterministic behavioral strategy and vice versa.
Proof. It is straightforward to show that we are able to create a behavioral strategy b
Moving from the root of the game tree of G for every I i , for which r p i (I i ) is defined, we create b(I i , a) = 1 for the action prescribed by r p i in I i . This creates equivalent behavior in all I i . Creating pure realization plan from deterministic behavioral strategy can be done by the same procedure, ignoring the parts of the tree unreachable when playing this strategy. ⊓ ⊔ Now we are ready to state the main result of this section.
Theorem 1. An A-loss recall game G has a Nash equilibrium in behavioral strategies if and only if there exists a Nash equilibrium b in behavioral strategies of the coarsest perfect recall refinement
, where b(H) stands for the behavioral strategy in the information set of G ′ formed by states in H.
Proof. First, since b is a Nash Equilibrium of G ′ we know that there exists no incentive for any player to deviate to any pure behavioral strategy in G ′ . From the interchangeability of pure behavioral strategies and pure realization plans in games with perfect recall [11] we know that there exists no pure realization plan to which any of the players wants to deviate. From Lemma 2, it follows that there can exist no pure realization plan in G, and therefore by Lemma 4 no pure behavioral strategy in G to which any of the players want to deviate. This, in combination with the fact, that b prescribes valid strategy in G implies that b is a Nash Equilibrium in behavioral strategies of G.
Second, we prove that there exists no Nash equilibrium b ′ in behavioral strategies of G which is not a Nash equilibrium of G ′ . Let us assume that such b ′ exists. This would imply that there is no pure behavioral strategy in G to which players want to deviate when playing according to b ′ , and therefore no pure realization plan (Lemma 4). However, then Lemma 3 implies that there is no pure realization plan and therefore pure behavioral strategy in G ′ either, implying that b ′ is a Nash Equilibrium in G ′ . This contradicts the assumption and completes the proof.
⊓ ⊔ Informally, Theorem 1 states that G has a Nash equilibrium in behavioral strategies if and only if there exists a behavioral Nash equilibrium b in G ′ which prescribes the same behavior in every information set which is connected to some imperfect recall information set of G. Corollary 1. An imperfect recall game G has a Nash equilibrium in behavioral strategies if there exists a Nash equilibrium b in behavioral strategies of the coarsest perfect recall refinement
, where b(H) stands for the behavioral strategy in the information set of G ′ formed by states in H, the opposite does not hold.
Proof. The proof of the implication follows directly from the first part of the proof of Theorem 1. Finally, we provide a counter-example showing that the opposite direction of the implication does not hold. Consider the game in left subfigure of Figure 3 . Here the only Nash equilibrium in behavioral strategies is playing d and e deterministically and mixing uniformly between g, h. The only Nash equilibrium of its coarsest perfect recall refinement (shown in right subfigure of Figure 3 ) is, however, playing d, e, h and i deterministically.
⊓ ⊔
Optimal Strategies in A-Loss Recall Games
The sufficient and necessary condition on the existence of NE described in the previous section allows us to provide additional characterization of NE strategies in A-loss recall games. First, we show that a Nash equilibrium of a two-player zero-sum A-loss recall game might be formed by a degenerate equilibrium of its coarsest perfect recall refinement. Next we show that both Nash equilibrium and maxmin strategy might require irrational numbers in A-loss recall games.
Properties of Nash Equilibria of A-Loss Recall Games
The possibly infinite set of all Nash equilibria of a game G can be completely described by a set of finitely many extreme Nash equilibria E (see, e.g., [1] ).
These equilibria have the property, that they cannot be obtained by any convex combination of other Nash equilibria of G. Additionally, all the non-extreme (also called degenerate) Nash equilibria of G are obtained as a convex combination of entries of E. For the case of two-player zero-sum games, we can say that E = E 1 × E 2 , where E i stands for strategies of player i that form a part of an extreme Nash equilibrium. In case of perfect recall two-player zero-sum games, entries of E i form the vertices of a convex polyhedron of optimal solutions of the sequence-form LP [9] computing the strategy for i. Finally, the expected value of every player is the same when all players play according to some Nash equilibrium strategy in zero-sum games. Let us consider the game from Figure 4 . Player 1 has 4 extreme Nash equilibria. All of them prescribe b(a) = 54 89 , They, however, differ in information sets I 1 and I 2 . The extreme equilibria are {b Claim. All the Nash equilibra of a two-player zero-sum A-loss recall game might be formed by a degenerate equilibria of its coarsest perfect recall refinement.
Proof. Consider an A-loss recall game G created from the game in Figure 4 by merging information sets I 1 and I 2 , and by mapping actions e to h, f to i, and g to j. Now we would like to check whether there is a Nash equilibrium in G. On the right side of Figure 4 we depict a triangle representing all the behavioral strategies that can occur in the merged information set. The dashed segment represents all the valid behavioral strategies consistent with Nash equilibrium in I 1 , the dotted line depicts the same for I 2 (notice that the extreme equilibria form the endpoints of these segments). As you can see there exists only one valid behavior which is consistent with the Nash equilibriumin of the resulting game, since the segments intersect (created, by combining 
Representation of Nash and Maxmin Strategies
In two-player zero-sum perfect recall games with rational payoffs, there exists an optimal behavioral strategy which uses only rational probabilities [7] . In imperfect recall games this no longer holds [7] . We show that even in zero-sum A-loss recall games both maxmin and NE strategies might require irrational numbers 5 .
Theorem 2. The maxmin strategy may require irrational numbers, even in twoplayer zero-sum A-loss recall game with rational payoffs.
Proof. Consider the game from Figure 5 that is a modification of the example from Figure 2 in [7] . The maxmin strategy of player 1 is trying to maximize This is maximized when
which leads to b(a) = 0.1(5 ± √ 5). ⊓ ⊔ Theorem 3. The Nash equilibrium strategies may require irrational numbers, even in two-player zero-sum A-loss recall game with rational payoffs.
2 form all the Nash equilibria of the game in Figure 5 .
Computational Complexity in A-loss Recall Games
Now we turn to the computational complexity and show that computing a maxmin strategy is NP-hard in A-loss recall games 6 and that checking if there exists a Nash equilibrium in behavioral strategies is also NP-hard in A-loss recall games 6 . In order to state the complexity results, we first need to specify the length of the input. We use the length of the input used by Koller and Megiddo [7] . The size of an integer N is log 2 (1 + |N |), the size of a rational number is the sum of sizes of its numerator and denominator in the reduced form. The size of the game equals the sum of sizes of payoffs and of probabilities associated with random moves. The hardness results use a reduction that extends the original reduction used by Koller and Megiddo in Proposition 2.6 [7] .
Theorem 4. The problem of deciding whether player 2 having an A-loss recall can guarantee an expected payoff of at least λ is NP-hard even if player 1 has perfect recall, there are no chance moves and the game is zero-sum.
Proof. The proof is made by reduction from 3-SAT problem. Given n clauses x j,1 ∨ x j,2 ∨ x j,3 we create a two person zero-sum game in a following way. In the root of the game player 2 chooses between n actions, each corresponding to one clause. Player 1 plays next with no information about the action chosen by player 2. He has again n actions available. In every state of player 1 n − 1 actions lead directly to a terminal state with utility (0, 0) and one action (with index corresponding to the index of action of player 2 preceding this state) leads to a state of player 2. Every such state of player 2 corresponds to the variable x j,1 where j is the index of the clause chosen in the root of the game. Every such state has actions T xj,1 , F xj,1 available, these actions correspond to setting the variable x j,1 to true or false respectively. After both T xj,1 , F xj,1 in x j,1 we reach state representing the assignment to x j,2 with the same setup (state representing the assignment to x j,3 is reached after that). After the assignment to x j,3 we reach the terminal state with utility (−nλ, nλ) if the assignment to x j,1 , x j,2 and x j,3 satisfies the clause x j,1 ∨x j,2 ∨x j,3 , (0, 0) otherwise. The information sets of player 2 group together all the states corresponding to the assignment to one variable in the original 3-SAT problem (note that we assume that the order of variables in every clause follows some complete ordering on the whole set of variables in the 3-SAT problem). An example of the reduction is shown in Figure 6 .
When the reduction is done in this way, we are sure that player 2 can guarantee the outcome of λ if and only if there is an assignment of variables satisfying the original 3-SAT problem. This holds since if there would be at least one clause not satisfied, player 1 could choose an action corresponding to this clause guaranteeing an expected outcome of 0 for both players. On the other hand if player 2 can guarantee an outcome of λ all the clauses must be satisfiable, since otherwise player 1 could again choose the action corresponding to the unsatisfiable clause leading to an outcome of 0 for both.
The reduction is polynomial, since the game has n(n − 1) + 2 3 n leafs.
The last thing which remains to be shown is that player 2 has A-loss recall. This is satisfied, since any loss of information about actions of player 1 can be tracked back to forgetting his own action taken in the root.
⊓ ⊔ Theorem 5. If a two player game has A-loss recall, it is NP-hard to check whether there is a Nash equilibrium in behavioral strategies.
Proof. The proof is made by reduction from 3-SAT problem. The reduction is similar to the one in proof of Theorem 4. The only change in the resulting game is the substitution of the utility in the leafs after actions of player 1 by (−1, 1) and in the leafs corresponding to satisfying the given clause by (−0.5, 0.5).
When the reduction is done in this way, we are sure that the game has a Nash equilibrium in behavioral strategies if and only if there is an assignment of variables satisfying the original 3-SAT problem. This holds since if there would be at least one clause not satisfied in each assignment, there is no stable strategy, as player 2 can deviate from any strategy to strategy making some clause k satisfied (one clause can be always satisfied in SAT problem) and play the action corresponding to clause k deterministically in the root. This, however, does not lead to a stable strategy either, since then player 1 wants to deviate to the action corresponding to k clause as he gets better expected utility from the subtree than the immediate -1 from the leafs reached by other actions. Player 2 then, however, wants to deviate to any other action in the root because it yields the expected value of 1 for him. After that the whole process repeats itself. On the other hand, if there exists a Nash equilibrium in behavioral strategies, all the clauses must be satisfiable, since, as discussed above, there is no stable strategy if there is at least one clause not satisfied in each assignment. If all clauses are satisfied in some assignment then the Nash equilibrium is to play uniformly in the root and according to the assignment in the rest of the tree for player 2 and to play uniformly for player 1.
Conclusion
We show several key properties of a subclass of imperfect recall games, called A-loss recall games, where every loss of information of a player can be tracked to forgetting his own actions. We provide new insights defining a sufficient and necessary condition for the existence of a Nash equilibrium in behavioral strategies in two-player A-loss recall games. Furthermore, we show that both maxmin and Nash equilibrium might require irrational numbers, even when the utilities are rational. Finally, we show NP-hardness of computational problems related to the existence of a Nash equilibrium and computing a maxmin strategy. These results show that even though the A-loss recall games have promising properties, the computational challenges are still present.
